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Increased attention to the development potential of international migration has led to calls 
for greater global cooperation and for developed countries to consider temporary worker 
programs and other options for increasing the number of immigrants admitted. However, 
less attention has been devoted to policies that migrant-sending countries pursue which 
impact on the ability of people to emigrate under the existing system. This paper 
documents the existence and impact of two such policies: passport costs and legal 
restrictions on emigration. New data collected on passport costs in 127 countries around 
the world reveals enormous variation in the cost of a passport from one country to the 
next. One in every ten countries in our sample are found to have passport costs exceeding 
10 percent of annual per capita income. High passport costs are found to be associated 
with poor governance, especially in terms of the quality of the bureaucracy, and with 
lower levels of migration. Countries which place legal restrictions on the rights of women 
to emigrate are also found to have lower migration rates than countries with similar 
income and population levels. These findings suggest there is scope for some developing 
countries to receive greater benefits from migration by tearing down the paper walls they 
place around their own citizens. 
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1. Introduction: 
The importance of international migration for development has received increasing 
attention from both the research and policy communities. The United Nations Global 
Commission on International Migration recently issued a comprehensive report calling 
for greater consultation and cooperation between states and greater attention to the rights 
and integration needs of migrants once they arrive (GCIM, 2005). The World Bank has 
devoted its 2006 Global Economic Prospects report to remittances and migration, and 
emphasizes the importance of competition and regulation for lowering the cost of sending 
money transfers. Ambitious calls for greater freedom of movement under GATS Mode 4 
negotiations, temporary worker programs, and other forms of bilateral or global 
cooperation have become part of the global policy debate. 
 
However, far less attention has been given to barriers that countries place in the way of 
their own citizens who wish to emigrate. The right to emigrate is enshrined in Article 13 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
2, but there remains a sizeable number of 
countries who place legal restrictions on exit, especially in the case of women. Even 
when no legal restrictions are in place, countries can put a sizeable burden on potential 
migrants through the imposition of large passport fees, and cumbersome procedures for 
obtaining a passport. However, little is known about the size of such fees across countries 
or their importance for migration. 
 
This paper presents new data collected on passport costs in 127 countries around the 
world and documents the large amount of heterogeneity in costs across countries. The 
                                                 
2 See http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm   - 3 - 
cost of a passport is found to range from $0 to $333
3, and from 0 percent to 125 percent 
of annual per capita national income. Passport costs as a share of national income are 
higher in poorer countries, and in countries with worse measures of governance, in 
particular, in countries with poor bureaucracy. High passport costs are found to be 
associated with lower levels of migration, suggesting scope for increasing migration 
through domestic policy reform.  
 
Evidence on the time costs of obtaining a passport shows differences across countries as 
to whether or not a passport can be obtained by post rather than in person, and in the time 
taken for processing a passport. High fees for expedited service are indications of the 
demand for more rapid processing in many countries. In addition to passport costs, this 
study documents legal restrictions on exit, such as requirements that citizens obtain exit 
visas or that women receive the permission of their husband or father to travel. Countries 
with restrictions on travel are shown to have lower rates of migration than countries of 
similar population and income levels without such restrictions.  
 
Overall the evidence does suggest that there are real barriers placed in the way of 
emigration in a number of countries. Countries that wish to benefit from remittances, 
diaspora, technology transfer, return migration from trained nations, and other 
developmental impacts of migration can start by tearing down the paper walls they put 
around their own citizens. 
 
                                                 
3 Unless indicated otherwise, all prices given in this paper are in terms of October 2005 United States 
Dollars.   - 4 - 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents summary statistics 
on the passport data, Section 3 examines the relationship between passport costs and 
measures of governance and Section 4 then relates the per capita migrant stock of a 
country to passport costs and other determinants of migration. Section 5 summarizes the 
evidence on the time costs involved in obtaining a passport, Section 6 documents a 
number of legal restrictions on emigration and their relationship with migrant stock and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Passport Costs around the World 
Data on the cost of a passport in the country of issue was collected in October 2005. The 
principal form of collection was through faxes, emails and telephone calls to the consular 
offices of each country having an embassy or consulate office in the United States. Other 
sources of information included websites of passport authorities, telephone calls and 
faxes to the relevant government ministry in charge of issuing passports in countries, and 
through staff in World Bank country offices. Passport costs were collected in local 
currency, and converted into United States dollars at the prevailing interbank exchange 
rate.
4 After several follow-up attempts, data were able to be collected for passport costs in 
127 countries.  
 
In many countries there is not a single passport cost. Passport costs may differ for 
children and adults, for first-time passports compared to renewals, and for expedited 
service compared to regular service. Several countries also offer the options as to the 
duration of the passport (for example, 1, 5 or 10 years) and as to the number of pages 
                                                 
4 Obtained from www.oanda.com and www.xe.com.    - 5 - 
(e.g. 1000 Rupees ($22.29) for a 36 page book or 1500 Rupees ($33.44) for a 60 page 
book in India).
5 Since the availability of these additional features differs across countries, 
an attempt to standardize was made, by collecting the price of a first-time adult passport 
valid for five years duration, of the standard number of pages and obtained via the 
standard processing period. When the country only issues a 10-year passport, this is the 
price reported.
6 The cost collected contains the cost of the passport itself, but not the cost 
of paying for photographs, birth certificates, or other such documents which are required 
along with the passport application. 
 
The full list of countries and passport costs are provided in an Appendix. Figure 1 is a 
histogram of passport prices. It shows a wide variation in passport costs across the world. 
The majority of passports cost less than US$50, with a median cost of $38.60, the 
prevailing cost in Guatemala and Samoa. However, a number of countries charge over 
$100 and others charge less than $10. Table 1 lists the ten least expensive and ten most 
expensive countries. There is substantial geographic and economic heterogeneity 
amongst these. Passports are free in Armenia, only $4.74 in Swaziland and $4.83 in 
Luxembourg. Turkey, Lebanon and Chad are the most expensive, with a 5-year passport 
in Turkey costing $333. Turkey does also offer a one-year passport for $130.53, and 
Lebanon offers a one-year passport for $40.  
 
Figure 1: Histogram of Passport Prices 
                                                 
5 In addition, the same type of passport varies slightly in price across different districts in Belgium and the 
Netherlands due to small district level administrative fees charged. We use typical prices for these 
countries, provided by the Embassies. 
6 One justification for not dividing the 10-year passport price in half is that potential migrants must pay the 
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Table 1: Least and Most Expensive Passports (Cost in US Dollars)
Least Expensive Ten Countries Most Expensive Ten Countries
Armenia 0.00 Turkey 333.57
Swaziland 4.74 Lebanon 200.00
Luxembourg 4.83 Chad 156.40
Botswana 5.34 Norway 152.34
Kenya 5.37 Democratic Republic of Congo 150.00
Ghana 5.45 Denmark 145.67
Guyana 6.30 Bosnia-Herzegovina 143.72
Czech Republic 8.04 Croatia 129.73
Philippines 8.95 Australia 115.22
El Salvador 9.14 United States 97.00  
 
Figure 2 shows that there is a general tendency for passport costs to rise with per capita 
incomes: an OLS regression of log passport cost on log income per capita shows that a 
10% increase in per capita national income is associated with a 1.1% increase in the cost 
of a passport. The slope is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (T-
statistic of 2.34). However, Figure 2 also shows a large amount of variation around the 
OLS line, showing substantial differences in passport pricing policies across countries 
with similar income levels.    - 7 - 
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One might expect high passport costs to have much less affect on ability to migrate in 
high-income countries than in low-income countries. In particular, the cost of a passport 
relative to income may determine whether individuals are able to migrate or not. We 
therefore standardize passport costs by per capita Gross National Income in 2004, taken 
from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
7 Table 2 then lists the 23 
countries in our sample in which a passport costs 5 percent or more of annual per capita 
income. The most expensive passport relative to income occurs in the Democratic 
                                                 
7 2003 GNI data was used for a few countries where 2004 GNI was not available.   - 8 - 
Republic of Congo where a passport costs 125 percent of per capita income.
8 Eleven out 
of the fourteen countries where passport costs are 10 percent or more of annual per capita 
income are located in Africa. Nevertheless, other African countries manage to maintain 
low costs: passport costs are only 1.4% of per capita income in Ghana, 1.17% in Kenya, 
0.3% in Swaziland and 0.12% in Botswana. 
Table 2: Countries where a passport costs 5% or more of annual per capita income
% pcGNI % pcGNI
Democratic Republic of Congo 125.0 Cameroon 11.4
Chad 60.2 Nigeria 10.0
Burundi 50.9 Turkey 8.9
Rwanda 41.5 Mauritania 8.7
Ethiopia 31.1 Benin 8.6
Nepal 26.3 Republic of Congo 8.5
Niger 19.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.0
Central African Republic 17.7 Bolivia 6.7
Tanzania 13.4 The Gambia 6.0
Tajikistan 13.4 Papua New Guinea 5.3
Burkina Faso 12.7 Bangladesh 5.2
Lao PDR 11.8
pcGNI = annual per capita Gross National Income  
 
3. What determines passport costs? 
Passport costs which are high relative to income are likely to act as a barrier to the ability 
of citizens to migrate. The question which then arises is why they are so high. One 
possible explanation is that passport costs are high relative to income in poorly governed 
countries. This may be due to poor capacity to efficiently carry out bureaucratic 
procedures, a repressive desire to stop citizens traveling, or to the inability to collect 
government revenue through standard taxation procedures. To investigate the relationship 
between passport costs and government, we employ the Governance IV indicators for the 
                                                 
8 Note that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a passport has an official price of US$80, but the going 
price for an ordinary citizen is US$150 (Source: World Bank resident mission).   - 9 - 
year 2004 from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). They present indicators for the 
following six dimensions of governance: 
1)  Voice and Accountability: a measure of political, civil, and human rights, 
including the ability of citizens to participate in selection of a Government and 
media independence. 
2)  Political Stability and lack of Violence: a measure of the likelihood of the 
government in power being overthrown by violent or unconstitutional means. 
3)  Government Effectiveness: a measure of the quality of public service provision, 
and the competence of the bureaucracy. 
4)  Regulatory Quality: a measure of the incidence of market unfriendly policies and 
excessive regulation. 
5)  Rule of Law: a measure of the quality of contract enforcement, the incidence of 
crime, and the quality of the judiciary. 
6)  Control of Corruption: a measure of the use of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption. 
 
Each of the indicators is scaled to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, 
with higher scores representing better governance. Table 3 presents the results of 
regressing the cost of a passport relative to per capita income on these measures of 
governance. As the measures are quite highly correlated with one another, we include 
each one separately before including them jointly. Each of the different measures has a 
negative coefficient when entered separately, and all are significant except for voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality. This shows that higher passport prices relative to   - 10 - 
income are associated with worse governance. The largest magnitude is seen for 
government effectiveness, measuring the quality of the bureaucracy. A one standard 
deviation improvement in government effectiveness (for example, moving from Chad’s 
level to Brazil’s level) is associated with a 5 percentage point lower passport cost as a 
percentage of national income. Passport costs relative to income are also higher in 
countries with less political stability and more corruption. When we include all of the 
measures together, none is individually significant, reflecting the high intra-correlation. 
Table 3: Do Countries with better Governance have lower passport costs?
Dependent Variable: Passport Cost as a Percentage of GNI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GNI per capita -46.198 -45.588 -44.706 -50.886 -48.110 -46.478 -49.513 -46.975
(3.38)*** (3.42)*** (3.54)*** (3.26)*** (3.39)*** (3.44)*** (3.36)*** (3.50)***
log GNI per capita squared 2.604 2.614 2.590 3.035 2.884 2.726 2.977 2.825
(3.28)*** (3.29)*** (3.38)*** (3.08)*** (3.18)*** (3.21)*** (3.20)*** (3.29)***
Voice and Accountability -1.775 -0.470
(1.53) (0.46)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence -2.850 -1.648
(1.74)* (1.25)
Control of Corruption -4.036 1.423
(1.83)* (0.54)
Rule of Law -4.721 -0.935
(1.85)* (0.30)
Regulatory Quality -3.480 0.393
(1.40) (0.15)
Government Effectiveness -4.981 -4.312
(2.10)** (1.61)
Constant 201.528 196.313 190.697 210.941 198.901 196.349 204.182 193.855
(3.51)*** (3.59)*** (3.74)*** (3.48)*** (3.64)*** (3.70)*** (3.57)*** (3.74)***
Observations 127 127 127 126 127 126 127 126
R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53
Robust t statistics in parentheses 




4. Are High Passport Costs a Barrier to Migration? 
The previous two sections have shown that passport costs are high relative to per capita 
income in some countries, and that one explanation for high passport costs is poor   - 11 - 
governance. We now turn to examining whether high passport costs act as a barrier to 
migration. We employ migration stock data based on country of birth from version 4 of 
the bilateral migration stock database of Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2005). 
This quantifies migration stock based largely on the population censuses taken in 
2000/01. We then calculate emigration stock as a percentage of each countries population 
in 2000.  
 
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the proportion of emigrants a country has and its 
passport costs. The figure is truncated at passport costs of 20% of per capita income, 
effectively dropping the six most expensive countries in Table 2.
9 There is a clear 
negative relationship, with countries with higher passport costs having fewer emigrants. 
The only country with emigrant share above 10 percent of the population among those 
countries with passport costs above 5 percent of per capita income is Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a clear outlier on the graph. The high emigrant share for this country is 





Figure 3: Higher Passport Costs are Associated with Less Emigrants 
                                                 
9 Of these countries, Nepal has a 2.2% migrant share, while the other countries have migrant shares under 























Table 4 then examines how robust the relationship seen in Figure 3 is to the inclusion of 
other determinants of migration which may also be correlated with passport costs. 
Column 1 shows that the negative relationship seen in Figure 3 is significant, although 
passport costs only explain a small fraction of the variation in migration. Column 2 adds 
log population, log national income per capita, and government effectiveness as controls. 
The addition of these controls causes the coefficient on passport costs to fall in 
magnitude, but it remains significant. One potential concern is that the relationship in 
Figure 3 appears nonlinear, and one may wonder whether all the results are being driven 
by countries with extremely high passport costs. We explore this nonlinearity in two 
ways. Column 3 drops countries in which passport costs are higher than 20 percent of per 
capita annual income, and shows that the magnitude of the coefficient on passport costs 
actually increases in absolute value. Columns 4 and 5 add a quadratic term in passport 
costs as a percentage of per capita annual income. Both specifications show evidence for   - 13 - 
a nonlinear effect, with a stronger effect of passport costs on emigrant stock when 
passport costs are below extremely high values.  For countries with passport costs less 
than 20 percent of national income, we estimate that lowering passport costs by one 
percent is associated with a 0.75 percent increase in emigrants per capita. Countries with 
very high migration costs have less impact from a one percent decrease, since costs still 
remain very high. They therefore require greater reductions in costs to boost migrant 
numbers. 
Table 4: Do Countries with Higher Passport Costs have less Emigrants?
Dependent Variable: Emigrants per capita (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passport Cost as % of GNI -0.272 -0.156 -0.544 -0.757 -0.422
(4.09)*** (2.37)** (2.34)** (3.95)*** (1.51)
Passport Cost as % of GNI Squared 0.011 0.005
(3.17)*** (1.17)
Log of Population -3.700 -3.688 -3.671
(5.64)*** (5.68)*** (5.63)***
Log of GNI per capita 2.193 1.823 1.805
(1.71)* (1.28) (1.25)
Government Effectiveness -3.840 -4.023 -3.734
(1.97)* (2.01)** (1.89)*
Constant 9.452 50.391 54.142 10.372 53.635
(7.39)*** (3.67)*** (3.61)*** (7.10)*** (3.54)***
Trimmed Sample no no <20% no no
p-value for test of joint significance: 0.000 0.083
Observations 124 124 119 124 124
R-squared 0.04 0.45 0.45 0.06 0.45
Notes:
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Column 3 trims countries with passport costs which are above 20% of per capita national income  
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This analysis has examined the relationship between the stock of emigrants a country has 
and its current passport cost. The advantage of the emigrant stock measure is that it is 
based on national census and household survey data in many countries around the world. 
It therefore captures most of the world’s legal and illegal migration. The disadvantage of 
this measure is that if passport costs change at different rates across countries over time, 
then today’s passport prices may not be reflective of the relative prices prevailing at the 
time of emigration. Detailed migration flow data is even rarer than migration stock data
10, 
and so we restrict our analysis to legal emigration flow into the four traditional settlement 
countries of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
11 The total migration 
flow into these four countries in 2004 is then expressed as a percentage of the sending 
countries 2004 population. The correlation between the emigrant stock of a country and 
the flow into these four countries for our sample is 0.833. 
 
Table 5 then repeats Table 4, using emigrant flow rather than emigrant stock as the 
dependent variable. The median flow into the four traditional settlement countries in 
2004 was only 0.02% of the sending country population. Passport costs as a share of per 
capita annual income are found to be significantly related to emigration flows, in a 
nonlinear fashion. The size of the estimated effect is quite large: among countries with 
passport costs less than 20% of per capita annual income, dropping from the 75
th 
percentile of passport costs (2.5% of income) to the median (0.77% of income) is 
associated with a 0.024% increase, or doubling, of the emigration flow. 
                                                 
10 Many countries do not break down country of origin beyond the top ten or so sending countries.  
11 Migration flow data collected from the Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland 
Security in the United States; Citizenship and Immigration Canada in Canada; the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs in Australia; and the New Zealand Immigration 
Service in New Zealand.   - 15 - 
 
Table 5: Do Countries with Higher Passport Costs have less Emigrant Flow?
Dependent Variable: Emigrant flow per capita to USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 2004 (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Passport Cost as % of GNI -0.002 -0.001 -0.014 -0.006 -0.007
(2.60)** (1.36) (2.92)*** (4.01)*** (2.62)**
Passport Cost as % of GNI Squared 0.000 0.000
(3.63)*** (2.66)***
Log of Population -0.051 -0.050 -0.051
(4.13)*** (4.17)*** (4.15)***
Log of GNI per capita 0.021 0.000 0.007
(0.96) (0.02) (0.26)
Government Effectiveness -0.060 -0.057 -0.053
(1.68)* (1.56) (1.46)
Constant 0.118 0.759 0.948 0.128 0.889
(5.45)*** (2.69)*** (2.87)*** (5.47)*** (2.81)***
Trimmed Sample no no <20% no no
p-value for test of joint significance: 0.000 0.032
Observations 127 127 121 127 127
R-squared 0.01 0.28 0.30 0.03 0.29
Notes:
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Column 3 trims countries with passport costs which are above 20% of per capita national income  
 
Tables 4 and 5 have shown that countries with higher passport costs relative to income 
have lower stocks and flows of emigrants per capita, and that this finding is robust to the 
inclusion of a number of additional variables such as income and governance which 
might be correlated with both emigration and passport costs. Nevertheless, one should 
still be cautious not to interpret this result as necessarily showing that higher passport 
costs cause less migration to take place. A possible concern may be that the number of 
migrants a country has determinants the government’s decision on how much to charge 
for a passport.
12 A large number of migrants may be able to exert political pressure on 
                                                 
12 A large absolute number of migrants may also enable economies of scale in the production of passports, 
lowering the marginal cost of producing a passport in terms of staffing time and office expenses.   - 16 - 
governments to keep passport costs low, or alternatively governments may see high 
passport costs as a way of extracting taxes from a large pool of migrants. Further research 
is needed to understand the political economy of passport pricing.  
 
5. Time Costs and Passports 
In addition to financial costs, there are also large differences across countries in the time 
costs involved in obtaining a passport. For approximately 40 countries we were also able 
to collect information on whether a first-time passport must be obtained in person, or 
whether it could be obtained by mailing the appropriate documents and fees. Just over a 
quarter of the countries providing this information allow the passport to be obtained by 
mail (examples include Brazil, Mauritius, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka). 
The majority of countries require their citizens to present themselves in person to apply 
for a passport. While there may be security reasons for requiring this, it does involve an 
additional cost for the potential migrant. This is particularly the case in countries where 
passport-issuing offices are only located in major cities, and so individuals living outside 
major cities must travel possibly long distances to apply for their passport. As an 
example, prior to the decentralization of passport issuing, citizens of Nepal had to travel 
to Kathmandu to obtain a passport. For people living in some areas of Nepal, this 
required crossing mountain ranges, clearly providing a major barrier to obtaining a 
passport. 
 
The second type of time cost faced is the time taken for a passport to be issued after 
applying for it. This too varies widely across countries. The following are the reported   - 17 - 
processing times for a standard passport issue in selected countries: El Salvador 45 
minutes, Pakistan 8 days, New Zealand 10 days, Australia 10 days, Ireland 2 weeks, 
Ghana 1 month, Bulgaria 1 month, India 5 weeks, South Africa 6 weeks, United States 6 
weeks. Many countries offer the option of an expedited processing time for an extra 
payment. For example, Ghana charges 50,000 cedis ($5.45) for 1 month, 500,000 cedis 
($54.45) for one week, and 1,000,000 cedis ($108.90) for 1 day’s waiting period. 
Bulgaria charges 30 leva ($18.33) for one month’s processing time, and 150 leva 
($91.65) for one day’s processing time. Long waits may also give rise to corruption with 
passport issuing officials accepting bribes for faster processing. For example, witnesses 
in a Parliamentary hearing in Namibia testified that many of the passport issuing officials 
would frequently shut their offices for personal business, leading to months long waits for 
passports and bribes of four times the cost of a passport for faster service (Philander, 
2005). Although we are unable to quantify the impact of long waiting times on migration, 
the existence of fees up to 20 times the regular price for more rapid service does show 
that there is certainly demand for more efficient processing.  
 
6. Legal Barriers to Emigration 
In addition to price barriers, citizens in several nations also face legal barriers to 
obtaining a passport and to traveling out of their country. Table 6 details the 17 countries 
which place restrictions on the ability of women to legally obtain a passport or to travel 
out of their country. These restrictions take the form of preventing unmarried women 
traveling without the permission of their father or adult relative, and of married women 
traveling without the permission of their husband. Such legal restrictions coupled with   - 18 - 
societal pressures reduce the ability of women to migrate alone from such countries. For 
example, in Kuwait, where Egyptians and Syrians are among the major Arab migrant 
groups, Shah (2004) reports that there were twice as many migrant male Arabs as migrant 
females, and that only 12 percent of female Arab migrants were in the labor force, 
compared to 66 percent of Arab men. Most females were not working and accompanying 
family members. This contrasts strongly with female Asian migrants to the Gulf, who 
more often migrate alone as housemaids and for whom 77 percent were working. 
Married Women require their husband's permission Restrictions on both married and unmarried women
but no restriction on unmarried women Afghanistan
Algeria (women under 18) Iran
Democratic Republic of Congo Jordan
Gabon Kuwait (unmarried women under 21)
Uganda (when travelling with children) Libya
Qatar (women under 30)
Unmarried Women require their father's permission  Saudi Arabia
but no restriction on married women: Sudan
Egypt (women under 21) Swaziland
Syria (women under 18)
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
source: Country reports of U.S. Department of State (2005)
Table 6: Walling their Women in
 
 
In Table 7 we examine whether the presence of these restrictions on the freedom of 
women to emigrate is associated with a country having fewer migrants per capita.
13 Since 
we were unable to obtain passport costs for many of the countries with restrictions, we do 
not look at the joint impact of passport costs and restrictions, but instead regress migrants 
per capita on per capita income, the log of population, and the government effectiveness 
measure which was a prime determinant of passport costs. In Column 2 we also check 
how sensitive the results are to adding a squared term in per capita income and 
                                                 
13 Gender disaggregated migration data is not available at a sufficient level of detail to permit testing 
whether these restrictions have a greater effect on female migration, as one would expect.   - 19 - 
population. The results show that these restrictions are associated with less migration. 
Countries which restrict the rights of women to migrate have 5 to 6 percent less migrants 
per capita than countries with similar income, population, and governance levels which 
do not have these restrictions.  
Table 7: Do Restrictions on Women reduce Migration?
Dependent Variable: Migrants per capita (%)
(1) (2)
Restrictions on Women Emigrating -5.956 -5.344
(3.30)*** (3.49)***
Log of GNI per capita 3.001 12.139
(3.57)*** (3.80)***
Log of Population -3.073 -19.390
(5.34)*** (3.18)***
Government Effectiveness -3.421 -1.456
(2.38)** (0.94)
Log of GNI per capita squared -0.653
(2.81)***






Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  
 
Table 8 details countries where two other forms of legal restrictions on movement are in 
force. The first is a set of countries which requires citizens to obtain government 
permission or an exit visa in order to be able to travel. While permission may be granted 
in most cases in some of these countries, the process of requiring this permission 
introduces additional costs and uncertainty into the migration decision. A second type of 
legal restriction occurs in several countries with compulsory national service, which 
restrict the rights of travel of citizens of national service age who have not completed   - 20 - 
their service requirements. Since the age of national service closely corresponds to the 
age range at which individuals have the greatest propensity to migrate in many countries, 
these restrictions may prevent the young and mobile from being able to reap the rewards 
of migration. 
Table 8: Other Legal Restrictions on Emigration
Government permission or an Restrictions on travel of Citizens
exit visa required for of National Service Age












source: Country reports of U.S. Department of State (2005)  
 
7. Conclusions 
There is considerable scope for global gains from increased international migration (see 
Walmsley and Winters (2003) for one estimate of the size of the gains). Realization of 
many of these gains will indeed require greater willingness on the part of migrant 
receiving countries to explore mechanisms which allow for greater immigration, and for 
coordinated bilateral and multilateral arrangements. However, this paper has shown that 
there is also policy latitude on the part of many migrant-sending countries to enhance the 
ability of their citizens to emigrate.  Reduction of the cost of a passport, faster processing 
times, and the removal of any legal restrictions on emigration offer the potential for 
reaping additional gains from migration. 
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This paper also focuses attention on two elements of the cost of migration. There has 
been considerable attention devoted recently to the costs of sending remittances and the 
potential gains to be had from lowering these costs.
14 The formal costs of migrating have 
received much less attention, and there is considerable scope for further research which 
examines the role of formal migration costs in determining migration numbers and on the 
impact of policy changes in these dimensions. 
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Appendix: Passport Costs Around the World
Cost in   Cost as Cost in   Cost as Cost in   Cost as
Country USD % pcGNI Country USD % pcGNI Country USD % pcGNI
Albania 46.46 2.23 Fiji 42.52 1.58 Norway 152.34 0.29
Angola 50.00 4.85 Finland 48.31 0.15 Oman 12.95 0.16
Antigua and Barbuda 18.52 0.19 France 72.46 0.24 Pakistan 25.11 4.19
Argentina 25.20 0.70 Gambia, The 17.49 6.03 Palau 50.00 0.73
Armenia 0.00 0.00 Germany 86.95 0.29 Papua New Guinea 31.00 5.34
Australia 115.22 0.43 Ghana 5.45 1.43 Peru 62.41 2.60
Austria 83.33 0.26 Greece 65.34 0.39 Philippines 8.95 0.76
Azerbaijan 23.83 2.50 Grenada 37.41 0.99 Poland 31.72 0.50
Bahamas, The 29.85 0.20 Guatemala 38.60 1.81 Portugal 59.00 0.41
Bahrain 31.83 0.26 Guyana 6.30 0.64 Romania 30.66 1.10
Bangladesh 22.83 5.19 Honduras 35.00 3.40 Russian Federation 13.99 0.41
Barbados 62.66 0.68 Hong Kong, China 41.24 0.15 Rwanda 91.20 41.45
Belgium 95.41 0.31 Hungary 23.85 0.29 Samoa 38.60 2.08
Belize 15.27 0.39 Iceland 83.44 0.22 Saudi Arabia 79.99 0.77
Benin 45.55 8.59 India 22.29 3.60 Senegal 27.51 4.10
Bhutan 17.77 2.34 Indonesia 21.73 1.91 Seychelles 88.69 1.10
Bolivia 64.03 6.67 Ireland 90.58 0.26 Singapore 35.44 0.15
Bosnia and Herzegovina 143.72 7.04 Israel 47.37 0.27 Slovak Republic 30.76 0.47
Botswana 5.34 0.12 Italy 55.81 0.21 Slovenia 45.97 0.31
Brazil 39.91 1.29 Jamaica 39.48 1.36 South Africa 23.57 0.65
Bulgaria 18.33 0.67 Japan 86.47 0.23 Spain 19.58 0.09
Burkina Faso 45.60 12.70 Kenya 5.37 1.17 Sri Lanka 24.58 2.43
Burundi 45.82 50.91 Korea, Rep. 44.26 0.32 St. Kitts and Nevis 11.11 0.15
Cameroon 91.20 11.40 Lao PDR 46.02 11.80 St. Lucia 22.22 0.52
Canada 73.34 0.26 Lebanon 200.00 4.02 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 22.22 0.61
Central African Republic 54.72 17.65 Lesotho 11.41 1.54 Swaziland 4.74 0.30
Chad 156.40 60.15 Lithuania 20.91 0.36 Sweden 63.52 0.18
Chile 73.08 1.49 Luxembourg 4.83 0.01 Switzerland 92.38 0.19
China 37.50 2.90 Malaysia 79.57 1.71 Tajikistan 37.40 13.36
Colombia 29.50 1.50 Malta 33.51 0.27 Tanzania 44.25 13.41
Congo, Dem. Rep. 150.00 125.00 Mauritania 36.65 8.70 Thailand 24.39 1.00
Congo, Rep. 65.66 8.53 Mauritius 22.88 0.50 Tonga 43.48 2.40
Costa Rica 20.00 0.43 Mexico 82.11 1.21 Trinidad and Tobago 23.97 0.30
Croatia 129.73 1.97 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 50.00 2.51 Tunisia 28.70 1.10
Cyprus 52.13 0.30 Morocco 32.62 2.10 Turkey 333.57 8.90
Czech Republic 8.04 0.10 Namibia 24.44 1.03 Ukraine 33.97 2.70
Denmark 145.67 0.36 Nepal 68.40 26.30 United Kingdom 74.28 0.22
Dominica 37.04 1.01 Netherlands 56.94 0.18 United States 97.00 0.23
Ecuador 78.00 3.58 New Zealand 49.44 0.24 Vanuatu 45.35 3.38
Egypt, Arab Rep. 24.90 1.90 Nicaragua 23.75 3.01 Venezuela, RB 20.51 0.51
El Salvador 9.14 0.40 Niger 45.58 19.82 Vietnam 12.57 2.29
Estonia 11.46 0.16 Nigeria 38.79 9.95 Zambia 16.78 3.73
Ethiopia 34.24 31.10